The purpose of this paper is to estimate the rebate-retention rate of pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs).
Introduction
Almost all health care insurance plans rely on third-party contractors called pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to manage the prescription (Rx) drug benefit portion of the plan. Arguments for and against extending Medicare to cover outpatient Rx drugs costs sooner or later will come around to PBMs. What do they do? Where do their profits come from? Why are they interested in managing a Medicare Rx drug benefit plan? Can we insure that they will work in the best interest of Medicare beneficiaries?
The purpose of this paper is to estimate a key measure of PBMs' profitability --the rebate-retention rate.
The rebate-retention rate is the share of gross rebates received from drug manufacturers that is retained by PBMs. The rest is remitted to plan sponsors who use the rebates to defray costs and keep premiums down. We do this for second largest independent PBM-Express Scripts, Inc.-for its last three fiscal years. This choice was based on a unique opportunity that has recently presented itself when, upon the advice of its auditor PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Express Scripts decided to change the way it accounted for rebates. The change necessitated a one-time disclosure of gross receipts of rebates and related fees from drug manufacturers for the past three fiscal years. This information has allowed us to cut our estimating efforts in half and increased our confidence in our estimates. Even so, we present an approach to estimating gross rebate rates in Appendix II for cases where such information is not available.
There are several reasons why PBMs want to keep the rebate rebate-retention rate a secret. First, it
gives PBMs an edge in negotiating contracts because clients have no clue as to the range of rates that are obtainable. Another reason is that rebates are highly controversial and have been the focus of many legal challenges. Rebates have been characterized as anti-competitive and as "kick-backs" that are not allowed in the health care industry. One final reason why PBMs prefer to keep details about it sources of profit is to protect their "rising star" mail order operations. The profitability of mail order operations today is low for some PBMs due less than full capacity utilization. Still, PBMs have high hopes for mail order and they shelter this "rising star" by burying its margin in with the margins from rebates.
There will be intense pressure to disclose publicly the rebate-retention rate if market-based Medicare becomes a reality because suddenly a lot of tax dollars will be flowing through PBMs bank accounts. In fact, at the time it changed the way it accounted for rebates, Express Scripts disclosed that it remitted to its clients " in excess of 50%" of rebates and administrative fees it has received from drug manufacturers in fiscal 2002.
1 This represents the first official public disclosure by a major PBM of the share of gross rebates that is remitted and/or retained. We believe this disclosure shows an increasing realization that it is not in the best interests of PBMs to be so secretive about this number. While this revelation represents only a vague disclosure by a single major PBM, we believe that the trend toward more explicit disclosure will continue. In the meantime, we hope that our estimates will be useful in discussions about the profitability of PBMs and their role in managing a Medicare drug benefit program.
The Sources of PBM Profitability
PriceWaterhouseCoopers has written a very good short history of the evolution of PBMs. 2 Fifteen years ago the only significant source of revenue for PBMs was claims processing fees. PBMs did not have contractual relations with pharmacies because plan sponsors negotiated directly with pharmacies to set prescription prices. Back then PBMs were known mainly for computerizing claims processing and porting this software to the point-of-sale. Their only focus was minimizing claims processing costs, a goal totally in line with the goals of their clients.
That has changed today. PBM have become principals in contracts involving pharmacies. They now negotiate directly with pharmacies to set reimbursements. A source of gross profits now comes from something called "spread pricing" --negotiating a reimbursement differential between what PBMs receive from plan sponsors and what they pay pharmacies.
The introduction of the formulary into claims processing software has been another development that has become a source of profits. The formulary is a look-up table that PBMs have added to claims processing systems that checks a prescription request against a list of therapeutic equivalents preferred by the plan sponsor. The formulary can flag a pharmacist to request that a generic drug be substituted for a higher priced off-patented brand name drug. A formulary also can mandate that a pharmacist call a prescribing physician to seek approval for the substitution of one brand name drug for another in the same therapeutic class. The cost saving occurs when PBMs succeed in aligning most of its clients' formularies around a single brand name drug in a therapeutic class to the point that they collectively "move a market"
and garner significant market share rebates (MSRs) from the preferred drug manufacturer. These rebates are paid directly to the PBMs who in turn pass on shares to their plan sponsor clients.
One final source of profitability for the major PBMs has been their Rx drug mail order operations. PBMs have made it a point to emphasize in recent financial statements the dramatic year-to-year growth in mail order revenue. The reason for this growth has been the rapid growth in "maintenance drugs" for the elderly that don't require immediate delivery upon demand. The gross profit margins of PBM mail order operation is a closely guarded secret and may one day replace the rebate-retention rate as the number with the most of interest to outsiders.
How PBMs Account for Rebates
Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) govern how companies are supposed to account for revenue and costs. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) laws govern how such data is reported to the investing public. PBMs cite in their financial reports three different pronouncements that guide how they account for and report rebates received from drug manufacturers. The first is segment reporting as specified by SEC law. The principle governing segment reporting is to require companies to provide details to the investing public about revenue and costs by each line of business without damaging their ability to compete. PBMs have satisfied this requirement by breaking down theirs profit and loss statements into two segments. Quoting from Express Scripts 2003 10-K Report:
We are organized on the basis of services offered and have determined we have two reportable segments: PBM services and non-PBM services (defined in Note 1 "organization and operations"). We manage the pharmacy benefit within an operating segment that encompasses a fully integrated PBM service. The remaining operating service lines (SDS and Express Scripts Infusion Services) have been aggregated into a non-PBM reporting segment.
rebates, spread pricing, and mail order -remain lumped together in financial statements disclosed to the public. This does not mean that Express Scripts discloses nothing about individual sources. It regularly discloses revenue from mail order operations. And it was forced to make a one-time disclosure of gross revenue from rebates in conjunction with a recent change in how it accounted for rebates. But, this reveals only a part of the puzzle. It takes both revenue and cost figures to calculate gross profit margins.
None of the six major PBMs -AdvancePCS, Express Scripts, Caremark, Merck-Medco, Wellpoint, and Aetna --have ever broken out in an official annual report to the SEC both revenue and cost figures from any of the three major sources of profitability.
PBMs usually cite one of two GAAP rules in footnotes explaining how they account for rebates. Until
Express Scripts' recent change, all of the six major PBMs cited Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) Issue
No. 99-19 "Reporting Revenue Gross as a Principal versus Net as an Agent". This pronouncement set forth criteria that determined whether a company could report a source of revenue on a "gross basis" with gross receipts as revenue and the portion remitted to clients as costs or on a "net basis" with net receipts retained as net revenue. The auditors of PBMs have determined that they act as agents rather than as principals in handling rebates. Therefore, they should account for rebates on a "net basis". This determination has been challenged. 4 Reporting rebates on a "net basis" ---as all of the major PBMs except Express Scripts still do ---is sufficient to mask the rebate-retention rate. But, even if PBMs reported rebates on a "gross basis", segment reporting such as it is, would still keep the rebate-retention rate a secret. where RPS is reimbursement plus fees from plan sponsors, RPH is reimbursement to pharmacies, GRR is gross rebates received, and RR is rebates remitted, and where rrr is the rebate retention rate.
Express Scripts changed it accounting for rebates from an increase in revenue on a "net basis" to a reduction in revenue and cost on a "gross basis". It revised it financial statements for the past three fiscal years by reducing revenue and cost of sales by gross rebates received. This change had no effect on gross profits. Even with this change, rebate reductions are aggregated with other revenue and costs streams and a considerable effort is still required to estimate the rebate-retention rate.
Claims Processing Gross Profit Margin
This change in accounting required Express Scripts to disclose gross rebates received for the past three fiscal years. Basically this reduced the unknowns in the gross profit equation to two --gross profits from claims processing (RPS-RPH) and the rebate-retention rate (rrr). We are stuck with an unsolvable single equation with two unknowns. At best, we could portray our estimates as a "iso-profit" curve -a two dimensional curve representing sets of numbers for the rebate-retention rate and claims processing gross profits that are consistent with the aggregate gross profits of a company. We find this portrayal to be safe but uninteresting. We have come up with some guideposts that we use to narrow our estimates to a single number.
One guidepost comes from an U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) study of PBMs role in managing government employee health insurance plans:
Administrative fees for plans we reviewed varied but on the average accounted for about 1.5 percent of total plan drug spending in 2001. …While PBMs contractual arrangement with other plan may differ, the contractual arrangements with the FEHBP-participating plans we reviewed resulted in the PBMs passing through to the retail pharmacies the entire payment that they receive from the plans. With the relatively rapid growth of "maintenance drugs" for the elderly that lend themselves to mail order delivery, we believe that mail order will become a more important source of gross profits than retained rebates. PBMs interest in becoming managers of a Medicare Rx drug benefit program should be viewed more in terms of its impact on their mail order operations than in terms of its impact on other sources of profitability. The rebate retention rate is the ratio of retained rebates to gross rebates received. The two components of this ratio are estimated independently. In this section, we present an original approach to estimating the denominator of this ratio --the gross rebates received as a percentage of wholesale drug acquisition costs (WAC).
Rebates from drug manufacturers to PBMs generally fall into two categories: (1) volume or access fees, and (2) market share rebates (MSR). Brand name drug manufacturers pay volume fees to PBMs if an individual drug achieves a non-exclusive preferential status in a formulary. One source of estimates for rebates come from a PriceWaterhouseCoopers study for the government. This study is close to being an "insider report" as PriceWaterhouseCoopers is the auditor of most of largest PBMs.
Rebates typically represent a discount of 5% to 15% of drug costs and administrative fees an additional 1% to 3%. 9 The study confirms that manufacturers pay rebates on the basis of WAC. However, the study fails to clarify whether its estimates are for volume rebates or market share rebates or both.
We start the process of estimating MSRs with estimates of rate schedules presented to PBMs by drug manufacturers. These rebates are structured as a tiered system of percentages that are a function of the market swing above a baseline market share the PBMs deliver. Since MSRs are based on the aggregate share delivered by PBMs, they create a situation where formulary choices of individual plan sponsors affect the payoff of other plan sponsors who have contracted with the same PBM. They know that negotiating MSRs directly with plan sponsors would result in a lot of money paid for closed but mutually exclusive formularies with no net impact on aggregate market shares. The goal of drug manufacturers is not merely closed formularies, but closely aligned formularies.
We think that a manufacturer starts out by asking what is it willing to pay for, say a 1%, increase in sales for a particular drug it manufacturers. The most a manufacturer is willing to pay is the "contribution margin" ---price minus variable costs of sale --minus some target pre-tax earning rate. Using figures from the latest quarterly reports of one of the big patented drug manufacturers, Pfizer, we can translate this formula into specific numbers. 10 Pfizer reported the following rates and margins: cost of good sold (COG) of 15% (with a complementary gross profit margin of 85%); sales, general, and administrative (SG&A) --49%; and earning before interest and taxes (EBIT) --36%. Assuming COG is the sum of a variable cost of sale of 5% and a fixed cost production rate of 15%, then the contribution margin would be 95% and the willingness-to-pay, or contribution margin less EBIT, would be 95% minus 36% = 59%. The rebate that this manufacturer would be willing to pay for 1% increase in sales would be 1% times (95% minus 36%) = .59%.
What remains to be done is to translate rates of increase in the manufacturer's sales -which is the same as the whole acquisition cost (WAC)--into swings delivered by a PBM. This requires the manufacturer to set some baseline level of sales for the PBM and then to calculate that baseline as a percentage of the total sales (" baseline share") for that drug by the manufacturer. Assume for example that the baseline market share of company's sales managed by a PBM is set at 20%. Then a 10 point swing delivered by a PBM means a 2% increase in the total sales of the company. The PBM is rewarded with a MSR equal to .59% of the total sales of the drug for the company multiplied by two. This is equivalent to 5.9% of the drug sales or WAC controlled by the PBM.
In general the PBM rebate rate as a function of swing is = (swing) * (rebate margin). Thus a 10-point swing is rewarded by a 5.9% rebate; a 20-point swing is rewarded by an 11.8% rebate; a 30-point swing is rewarded by a 17.7% rebate; etc.
cost generic competition appears soon after. MSRs are not offered on off-patented drugs because generic alternatives are so cheap that drug companies would lose money offering rebates necessary to offset this cost difference. Assuming an 80/20 division between patented and off-patented WAC in case (2) , this means that MSR are paid on 27.2% of WAC. 
